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Abstract 
 
 
State aid is an area of competition law. State aid measures are used to remedy market failures 
and to help undertakings when they are facing difficulties. State aid control aims at ensuring a 
level playing field between aided and non-aided firms. During the 2007-2009 financial crisis, 
several banks have encountered difficulties, and Member States have been forced to help them 
out through diverse means. The European Commission has been comprehensive and has issued 
a temporary framework with an expiry date of application to guide Member States and 
accelerate the aid approval process. Nevertheless, a balance had to be found between protection 
of the financial stability and maintaining a level playing field. The financial crisis made the 
European Union realise that it lacked a harmonised set of rules concerning supervision and 
regulation of credit institutions at Union level. The creation of the Banking Union appears as 
drawn from a lesson learnt during the crisis.  
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Sammanfattning 
 
 
Statligt stöd är ett område för konkurrenslagstiftning. Statsstödsåtgärder används för att 
avhjälpa marknadsmisslyckanden och hjälpa företag när de står inför svårigheter. 
Statsstödskontroll syftar till att skapa lika villkor för stödda och icke-stödda företag. Under 
finanskrisen 2007–2009 har flera banker stött på svårigheter, och medlemsstaterna har tvingats 
hjälpa dem på olika sätt. Europeiska kommissionen har varit omfattande och har utfärdat ett 
tillfälligt ramverk med utgångsdatum för ansökan för att styra medlemsstaterna och påskynda 
godkännandet av statligt stöd. Ändå fick Kommissionen hitta en balans mellan skydd av 
finansiell stabilitet och upprätthållande av konkurrensen i Europeiska unionen. Finanskrisen 
gjorde att Europeiska unionen inser att det saknades en harmoniserad uppsättning regler för 
tillsyn och reglering av kreditinstitut på unionsnivå. Skapandet av bankunionen framträder som 
dragits av en läxa som man har lärt sig under krisen. 
 
Nyckelord: Statligt stöd, Finanskris, Bankunionen, Systemisk Finansiell Stabilitet 
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1. Introduction 
1.1. Purpose 
 
Subsidies granted to undertakings by Member States are controlled at European level. State aid 
consists of ‘an advantage in any form whatsoever conferred on a selective basis to undertakings 
by national public authorities’.1 State aid is thus a form of public intervention in the economy. 
The rules governing State aid can be found in the Lisbon Treaty.2 State aid may be incompatible 
with the internal market, as provided by Art 107(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (‘TFEU’) ‘Save as otherwise provided in the Treaties, any aid granted by a 
Member State or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens 
to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods 
shall, in so far as it affects trade between Member States, be incompatible with the internal 
market.’  
 
The control of the compatibility of State aid with the internal market by the European 
Commission (‘Commission’) is thus part of the competition framework and meets a specific set 
of rules. The principle underlying the concept of State aid control is that Member States should 
not favour certain undertakings over others, to protect free competition within the internal 
market. Competition is indeed essential to build a robust economy. However, in certain 
circumstances, State aid is required to safeguard undertakings and can thus be justified by 
reasons of general economic interest.  
 
During the financial crisis of 2008, massive State intervention occurred in the European Union. 
The financial crisis affected all sectors of the economy and challenged regulations especially in 
the banking sector. In 2008, the amount of aid granted to financial institutions reached €212 
billion, more than three times the amount of aid given to undertakings operating in other sectors 
of the economy.3 The banking sector is a fragile one, and its failure would have a negative 
impact on all the other sectors of the economy. Certain banks were thus considered ‘too big to 
fail.’ A systemic meltdown of the financial sector was feared after the Lehman Brothers 
                                                      
1 Doris Hildebrand, The Role of Economic Analysis in EU Competition Law (Kluwer Law International, 2016),  
p. 486. 
2 Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 2012/C 326/01. 
3 Common Market Law Review 47 :313-318, Kluwer Law International [2010] p. 314. 
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collapse in September 2008. Swift interventions by the governments of the Member States 
helped stabilize the financial sector. That is the reason why Member States granted large 
supports to their credit institutions. Different instruments have been applied to restore the 
soundness of the financial market and ensure its proper functioning.4 Banks were saved because 
the impact of their failure on consumer confidence and the viability of other banks would be 
too high for the government to allow it.5 In other words, Member States feared the systemic 
effects of the crisis on the financial sector. However, balance was needed between the necessity 
to safeguard the financial stability and the obligation to preserve competition within the Union.  
 
Many economists consider that the 2008 financial crisis was the worst recession since the Great 
Depression of the 1930s. Banks failed in waves during the 1929 crisis in the United States and 
caused adverse effects on all industries of the real economy. Milton Friedman and Anna 
Schwartz pointed out that difficulties of banks, aggravated by a loss of confidence in the 
banking industry, led to a rapid fall in the supply of liquidity.6 The banking industry was 
structurally weak in 1929: when one bank failed, the assets of others were frozen; one failure 
led to another, spreading with a domino effect.7 
 
In response to the 2008 financial crisis and the urgent need of support to the banking system, 
the Commission had to rethink the apprehension of State aid control and re-establish a 
comprehensive set of rules. The political mandate is now for ‘less and better targeted’ State 
aid.8 The question is, therefore, to know to what extent have the rules governing State aid in the 
financial sector been modified during the banking crisis, and what kind of measures have been 
taken to prevent the collapse of the banking system.  
 
 
 
                                                      
4 Common Market Law Review 47 :313-318, Kluwer Law International [2010] p. 313. 
5 Philip Lowe ‘State aid policy in the context of the financial crisis’ Competition policy newsletter n°2, 2009, p.4, 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/cpn/2009_2_1.pdf  
6 Ben S. Bernanke ‘Nonmonetary Effects of the Financial Crisis in the Propagation of the Great Depression’ in 
The American Economic Review, Vol. 73, No. 3 (Jun., 1983), p. 257. 
7 John Kenneth Galbraith, The Great Crash 1929 (Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Publishing Company, 1955), p. 179. 
8 Hans W. Friederiszick, Lars-Hendrik Röller, and Vincent Verouden, European State Aid Contro : An Economic 
Framework  (ed. Handbook of Antitrust Economics. Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press, 2008), Chapter 17, p. 625. 
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1.2. Research Questions 
 
How did the Commission apply State aid rules during the crisis? Is the creation of the 
Banking Union, with the European Central Bank as supranational supervisor, enough to 
prevent future recourse to State aid, through tools such as bail-in mechanisms instead of 
bailing out the banks, the Resolution Fund, and deposit guarantee schemes?  
 
1.3. Method and Material 
 
To provide an answer to these questions, I will start with a succinct overview of State aid history 
in the European Union and present the general rules applying to State aid control, as well as the 
standard approach of the Commission to State aid in the banking sector before the 2008 
financial crisis. 
Second, I will analyse the measures taken by the Commission during the crisis and the effect 
of the rescue plans of banks on competition and the Member States’ sovereign debts. 
Finally, I will examine the reform undertaken by the Union regarding rescue and restructuring 
of credit institutions post-crisis under the creation of the Banking Union. 
 
1.4. Delimitation 
 
The thesis focuses on State aid granted to credit institutions in the European Union as defined 
in EU law, and will thus not examine the effects of subsidies provided to any other kind of 
undertakings by the Member States.  
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2. Brief history of the concept of State Aid in EU Law 
2.1. GATT, ECSC and EEC rules 
 
(1) GATT  
An important antecedent of EU State aid law started is represented by the 1947 GATT, which 
provided for an obligation to notify subsidies and a prohibition of export subsidies for non-
primary products.9 The idea was that the liberalization of trade through the reduction of tariff 
customs could be balanced by domestic support; States could resort to subsidies while other 
trade barriers, easier to control, were abolished.10 It was therefore deemed necessary to control 
subsidies, to maintain the benefits of the reduction of tariffs customs on trade between the 
European States.  
 
(2) ECSC Treaty 
In 1951, Article 4(c) of the Treaty of Paris (Treaty establishing the ECSC)11 introduced the 
principle of prohibition of subsidies, which were considered incompatible with the common 
coal and steel market. Subsidies were strictly and without conditions banned. The article did 
not contain any criterion; there was no requirement of distortion of competition, selectivity test, 
or de minimis rule.12 Since 1965, general decisions by the Commission regarding aid were based 
on Article 95 ECSC Treaty, authorising under certain conditions the granting of aid by the 
Member States to the coal industry. This article allowed the provision of national aid considered 
compatible with the objectives of the Treaty. 
 
(3) EEC Treaty 
Rules regarding State aid in the EEC Treaty13 were no longer restricted to the coal and steel 
market. The Treaty provides that national aids are incompatible with the internal market when 
they distort competition and are liable to affect trade between Member States. Exceptions to 
the ban on State aid can be made, as the Treaty recognized that aid can be socially beneficial. 
The Treaty does not provide for Community aid.  
                                                      
9 Piernas Lòpez, The concept of State aid under EU Law (OUP, 2015), p. 35. 
10 Ibid., p. 32. 
11 Treaty constituting the European Coal and Steel Community, 1951, Article 4(c). 
12 Piernas Lòpez, The concept of State aid under EU Law (OUP, 2015), p. 34. 
13 Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, signed on 25 March 1957. 
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2.2. Evolution of the approach to State aid in the EU 
 
(1) Spaak report 
The Spaak report was drafted in 1956 by the Spaak Committee. The report stated that it is 
necessary to impose competition rules on undertakings to avoid agreements and practices that 
could have effects on barriers to trade.14 The report also suggested the reformer to prevent 
Member States from granting aids having as their object and effect the distortion of competition. 
The general rule emanating from the report was thus that State aid which distorts competition 
is incompatible with the single market. The report stated that the notion of aid must be broad 
so as to cover any support given from the Member States.15 The report gave the task to the 
Commission of discerning between compatible and non-compatible aid. The Member States 
had to pre-notify to the Commission any intended measure; yet, the Commission could act ex 
officio. 
 
The report created an important distinction between Member States measures: the drafters 
considered aids as artificial advantages granted by the States. Other benefits, i.e., regulatory 
measures or legislative disparities, which could also de facto create distortions, could not be 
assessed by the Commission through an ex-ante analysis, but only ex-post.  
 
(2) The Travaux préparatoires in Val Duchesse 
The Rome Treaties (EEC and Euratom Treaties) were negotiated at the Intergovernmental 
Conference on the Common Market and Euratom in Brussels, in 1956.   
 
The competition principle is very present in the EEC Treaty: The Treaty provides for 
competition rules having the purpose of preventing any distortion of competition, should they 
come from public authorities, cartels or monopolies.  
 
EEC Treaty Article 92 prohibits State aids that threaten to distort competition, as means to give 
a guarantee to private operators that competition in the free market would not be distorted by 
                                                      
14 Piernas Lòpez, The concept of State aid under EU Law (OUP, 2015), p. 36 
15 The Brussels report on the General Common Market (‘Spaak report’), 21 April 1956, p. 57, Section 2 ‘La règle 
générale est que sont incompatibles avec le marché commun les aides, sous quelque forme qu’elles soient 
accordées, qui faussent la concurrence et la répartition des activités en favorisant certaines entreprises ou certaines 
productions’. 
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State aid measures. The article contains the notion ‘or though State resources’, widening the 
scope of application for the notion of aid.16 
These two events resulted in a broad definition of the notion of State aid; as aid was seen mostly 
as a mean to distort competition by a Member State, an expanded definition was necessary to 
encompass subsidies.17  
 
Effective competition is the rationale behind a European State aid control. It is clear that the 
compatibility of State measures with the common market must be decided at EU level, the 
decision cannot be left to the Member States, if one wants a level playing field and fair 
competition to be maintained across the EU. State aid control is about controlling the behaviour 
of the national governments and to some degree the one of the recipient undertakings, by 
reducing moral hazard. The Commission is thus the only entity that is entrusted with the task 
of assessing State aid, even though it could be argued that national supervisory authorities 
would be better informed of the economic situation and market failures of their respective 
countries. That is the reason why excellent communication between the Member States and the 
European administration is necessary, by transmitting all relevant information needed to decide 
on the measure. 
 
In 2005, the Commission adopted the State Aid Action Plan and launched a reform of the State 
aid policy for the period 2005-2009. The idea was to bring a more economic-based test 
approach, to rethink the balance between State intervention and economic stability.18 The 
modernisation plan also includes an extension of the use of guidelines, to render the procedural 
State aid rules more transparent.19    
 
On 8 May 2012, the Commission launched a new State Aid Modernisation (‘SAM’) initiative, 
with the aim to consolidate the existing guidelines, including State aid guidelines on Rescue 
                                                      
16 Article 92(1) EEC Treaty ‘Save as otherwise provided in this Treaty, any aid granted by a Member State or 
through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring 
certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Member States, 
be incompatible with the common market.’ 
17 Piernas Lòpez, The concept of State aid under EU Law (OUP, 2015), p. 42. 
18 Doris Hildebrand, The Role of Economic Analysis in EU Competition Law (Kluwer Law International, 2016)  
p. 487. 
19 Speech/05/440 by Neelie Kroes, Former European Commissioner for Competition, ‘The State Aid Action Plan 
– Delivering Less and Better Targeted Aid’, London, 14th of July 2005, available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_SPEECH-05-440_en.htm?locale=en 
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and Restructuring aid.20 The Commission develops the notion of ‘burden-sharing’ with the 
SAM: the undertaking benefiting from restructuring aid should contribute to the restructuring 
with its own resources.21 
 
3. Standard Approach to State Aid Control: General Rules 
3.1. Some basics on the notion of State Aid   
 
Article 107(1) TFEU is the point of departure of State aid policy: this provision states that State 
aid is, in principle, incompatible with the internal market. Under Article 107(2) and (3), a 
measure can be declared compatible if one of the conditions stated is fulfilled. State aid should 
be granted to address market failures. 
 
Article 108 TFEU endows the Commission with the task of controlling the compatibility of 
State aid measures with the competition rules. The Commission assesses first if the measure at 
stake falls under its jurisdiction or not, and second, whether the measure is compatible with the 
internal market. The provision is designed so as to allow a margin of discretion to the 
administration, which leaves room for political decisions, such as authorizing the grant of 
exceptional amounts of aid during the crisis.  
 
The Treaties allows for several policy objectives for which State aid can be declared compatible 
with the internal market under control of the Commission. The discretionary powers of the 
Commission regarding State aid control is outlined in the soft law adopted by the Commission, 
such as Guidelines and Communications, on the legal basis of Article 107(3)(c).22 The 
guidelines have the purpose of making the proceedings more transparent and predictable. The 
guidelines also outline the policies of the Commission to reach EU objectives such as protection 
of the environment: i.e., the Guidelines on State aid for environmental protection and energy.23 
 
                                                      
20 Communication from the Commission – Guidelines on State aid for rescuing and restructuring non-financial 
undertakings in difficulty (OJ 2014 C 249/1). 
21 Doris Hildebrand, The Role of Economic Analysis in EU Competition Law (Kluwer Law International, 2016)  
p. 494. 
22 Hans W. Friederiszick, Lars-Hendrik Röller, and Vincent Verouden, European State Aid Control: An Economic 
Framework (ed. Handbook of Antitrust Economics. Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press, 2008), Chapter 17, P.627. 
23 Guidelines on State aid for environmental protection and energy 2014-2020, 2014/C 200/0. 
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Four criteria as developed by the case law must be fulfilled for a measure to be qualified as 
State aid, in the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU. The notion of State aid has been clarified by 
the Commission through the SAM.24 
 
(1) First, the aid must be granted by a State or through State resources to an undertaking.25 
The notion of State encompasses the State per se, as well as its administrations and 
organs.   
(2) Second, the aid must constitute an advantage for the recipient entity.26 This advantage 
can reside in a money transfer, but also in a tax exemption, for instance.  
(3) Third, the aid must affect trade between the Member States.27 
(4) Fourth, the measure must distort competition. The Commission should assess the effects 
of the measure on competition when analysing its compatibility with the internal 
market.28 
 
The two last criteria are considered fulfilled if the aid is selective. The measure must favour an 
undertaking or a group of undertakings, i.e., it cannot be a general measure.29 To affect 
competition and trade, the measure at issue must be likely to affect the balance between the 
recipient undertaking and its competitors.  
 
The notion of selectivity is composed of a geographical and a material variable: as for the 
geographical component, a measure is deemed selective if it treats differently undertakings in 
a particular part of the entire territory of a Member State, that is, more favourably than in the 
rest of this area. As for the material component, a measure is considered selective for all other 
forms of unequal treatment of undertakings by the intervention of a Member State. 
 
                                                      
24 Doris Hildebrand, The Role of Economic Analysis in EU Competition Law (Kluwer Law International, 2016)  
p. 501. 
25 See, inter alia, case C-102/87, France v Commission of the European Communities [1988] ECR I-4067; case T-
47/15, Germany v Commission [2016] EU:T:2016:281.  
26 See for instance Opinion of AG Jacobs, para 60, in case C-39/94, SFEI [1995] I-03547. 
27 See for instance case T-288/97, Regione autonoma Friuli-Venezia Giulia v Commission [2001] ECR II-01169, 
para 41. 
28 See for instance case C-143/99, Adria-Wien Pipeline GmbH and Wietersdorfer & Peggauer  
Zementwerke GmbH v Finanzlandesdirektion für Kärnten [2001] ECR I-8365. 
29 Hans W. Friederiszick, Lars-Hendrik Röller, and Vincent Verouden, European State Aid Control: An Economic 
Framework (ed. Handbook of Antitrust Economics. Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press, 2008), Chapter 17, p. 628. 
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When assessing a given measure, the Commission operates an economic analysis: the prudent 
private investor test, or market economy investor principle (‘MEIP’). The Commission 
examines the repayment terms of the aid; the investment or credit approved is only considered 
to be State aid if the monetary terms are lower than what a private investor would have agreed 
on. The action undertaken by the State in these cases is compared to the behaviour of a private 
investor.30 
 
3.2. State Aid rules of procedure 
3.2.1. Notification and assessment of the measure  
 
The Member State that intends to grant aid to an undertaking or a credit institution shall notify 
the measure to the Commission, according to Article 108(3) TFEU.31 The Commission has two 
months to take a decision: the Commission can either decide that the aid does not constitute 
State aid, that it constitutes State aid and is compatible or not with the internal market, or that 
the measure raises serious doubts and needs to be further investigated. 
 
During the preliminary phase, the Commission examines the measure at stake and decides 
whether it constitutes State aid or not. If the Commission finds that the measure does not 
constitute State aid, the measure may be implemented. Only measures that constitute State aid 
within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU are subject to EU State aid control.32 If the 
Commission finds that it is State aid, it assesses then its compatibility with the internal market. 
Measures falling under the scope of Article 107(2) TFEU are automatically exempted, and the 
Commission may clear the measure under Article 107(3) TFEU, benefiting from a certain 
discretion. 
 
                                                      
30 See for instance case T-103/14, Frucona Košice v Commission [2016] EU:T:2016:152, para 268, in which the 
General Court ruled that it was for the Commission to apply the private investor test and to determine whether the 
recipient undertaking would have or not manifestly obtained comparable facilities from a private investor. 
31 Article 108(3) TFEU ‘The Commission shall be informed, in sufficient time to enable it to submit its comments, 
of any plan to grant or alter aid (…).’ 
32 Hans W. Friederiszick, Lars-Hendrik Röller, and Vincent Verouden, European State Aid Control: An Economic 
Framework (ed. Handbook of Antitrust Economics. Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press, 2008), Chapter 17, p. 627. 
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If the measure raises serious doubts during this first phase, the Commission shall open the 
formal procedure and pursue an in-depth investigation.33 This decision is an obligation and can 
be challenged before the CJEU. In the case the Commission decides that the measure is not 
compatible, the Member State is not authorised to put the aid in application, in accordance with 
Article 108(3) TFEU (the standstill clause).34 The Commission may use injunctions against the 
Member State concerned to enforce its refusal decision or order the recovery of the aid if it has 
already been paid out.  
The recipient bank or undertaking does not play a direct role in the procedure, the decision of 
the Commission is directly addressed to the Member State. But the entity may send information 
and observations to the Commission during the process. 
 
The content of the decision should reflect the economic assessment of the efficiency of the 
measure made by the Commission and whether it appropriately addresses the failure. The 
Commission should balance the costs to taxpayers with the benefits to consumers. The 
Commission is under the obligation to state reason, within the meaning of Article 296 TFEU.35 
Recourse to State aid should have the incentive effect of changing the firm’s behaviour to have 
a beneficial effect on consumers. The decision should also contain a safeguard against windfalls 
profits for the recipient bank; the amount of the aid should be proportionate to the desired result.  
3.2.2. Exceptions to the notification 
 
As stated in the paragraph above, the principle regarding aid is that it must be notified ex ante 
by the Member State to the Commission.  
However, there are some exceptions to this general rule: some categories of aids do not need to 
be notified.  
 
(1) De minimis approach: Small amounts of aid, up to 200.000 euros granted over a period 
of three fiscal years are presumed to have an insignificant impact on competition and 
                                                      
33 Article 182 TFEU; Article 6 of Council Regulation (EU) 2015/1589 of 13 July 2015 laying down detailed rules 
for the application of Article 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (OJ L 248, 24.9.2015). 
34 Article 108(2) TFEU ‘If, after giving notice to the parties concerned to submit their comments, the Commission 
finds that aid granted by a State or through State resources is not compatible with the internal market having regard 
to Article 107, or that such aid is being misused, it shall decide that the State concerned shall abolish or alter such 
aid within a period of time to be determined by the Commission. 
35 Franz Jürgen Säcker, Frank Montag, European State Aid Law: a Commentary (C.H.Beck-Hart-Nomos, 2016), 
p. 273. 
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on trade between Member States and thus fall outside the jurisdiction of the Commission 
and do not need to be authorized.36  
(2) Block exemption regulations: Some categories of aid benefit from block exemption 
regulations and are presumed compatible with the internal market.37 For instance, 
employment aid falls out of the jurisdiction of EU control. Block exemption regulations 
encourage ‘good’ aid that fosters economic growth and reduce the administrative burden 
for the Member States and the Commission, while allowing the latter to focus on more 
distortive kind of aid.38 
(3) Aid previously authorised: Aid linked to a scheme already authorised does not need to 
be notified to the Commission, as the scheme has already been deemed compatible with 
the internal market, provided that it does not constitute new aid. 
 
Amounts of aid falling under the scope of these exceptions only need to be notified to the 
Commission ex post.39 
 
3.3. Judicial review of Commission decisions in the field of State aid 
The Commission being a European institution,40 its decisions are subject to judicial review by 
the CJEU, under Article 263 TFEU.41 An action for annulment can be brought by any party 
satisfying the conditions under this Article, namely being directly and individually concerned 
by the decision of the Commission, within the meaning of the Plaumann doctrine.42 The 
recipient undertaking, or a competitor to it, may thus have locus standi before the Court. As for 
every action undertaken under Article 263 TFEU, the conditions for admissibility are quite 
                                                      
36 Commission Regulation (EU) No 1407/2013 of 18 December 2013 on the application of Articles 107 and 108 
of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to de minimis aid (OJ L 352, 24.12.2013), Article 3(2). 
37 Commission Regulation (EU) No 651/2014 of 17 June 2014 declaring certain categories of aid compatible with 
the internal market in application of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty (OJ L 187/1, 26.6.2014). 
38 Press release from the European Commission ‘State aid: Commission exempts more aid measures from prior 
notification’ Brussels, 21 May 2014. 
39 Hans W. Friederiszick, Lars-Hendrik Röller, and Vincent Verouden, European State Aid Control: An Economic 
Framework (ed. Handbook of Antitrust Economics. Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press, 2008), Chapter 17, p. 627. 
40 Article 13(1) TEU. 
41 Article 263(1) TFEU ‘The Court of Justice of the European Union shall review the legality of legislative acts, 
of acts of the Council, of the Commission and of the European Central Bank, other than recommendations and 
opinions, and of acts of the European Parliament and of the European Council intended to produce legal effects 
vis-à-vis third parties.’ 
42 Case 25/62, Plaumann v Commission, EU:C:1963:17 [1963]. 
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tough to satisfy; for instance, in its recent judgments Heitkamp BauHolding v Commission and 
GFKL Financial Services v Commission, the General Court found that that an undertaking 
could not, in principle, bring an action for annulment of a Commission decision prohibiting a 
sectoral aid scheme if it was concerned by that decision solely by being a potential beneficiary 
of the scheme.43 
The General Court will review the facts and the legality of the decision but will leave complex 
economic assessments largely to the discretion of the Commission.  
 
In 2016, 50 State aid cases were decided by the judges of the General Court, out of a total of 
755 cases completed. State aid represents thus around 6.5% of the General Court’s activity.44 
 
3.4. State Aid rules in the Financial Sector 
 
Prior to the financial crisis, there were no specific State aid rules applicable to the financial 
sector.45 The importance of the State aid control in the banking sector has fundamentally 
changed with the crisis.46 Before October 2008, State measures granted to banks were dealt 
under the 2004 Rescue and Restructuring Guidelines,47 and Article 107(3)(c) TFEU.48 
 
Aids in the financial sector are granted to credit institutions and may take various forms. Aids 
may have adverse effects on the competition and the financial stability of the European Union. 
3.4.1. Definition of a credit institution  
 
The definition of a credit institution in current EU law can be found in Article 4(1)(1) of the 
Capital Requirements Regulation (‘CRR’), which states that ‘'credit institution' means an 
                                                      
43 Case T-287/11, Heitkamp BauHolding v Commission, EU:T:2016:60 [2016] and case T-620/11, GFKL 
Financial Services v Commission, EU:T:2016:59 [2016]. 
44Annual report of the Court of Justice of the European Union, Judicial Activity 2016, p. 209, available at 
https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2017-03/ra_jur_2016_en_web.pdf 
45 Kelyn Bacon QC, European Union Law of State Aid, Third Edition (OUP, 2017), p. 364. 
46 Franz Jürgen Säcker, Frank Montag, European State Aid Law: a Commentary (C.H.Beck-Hart-Nomos, 2016), 
p. 1291. 
47 Communication from the Commission - Community guidelines on State aid for rescuing and restructuring firms 
in difficulty (OJ C 244, 1.10.2004). 
48 Article 107(3)(c) states that ‘the following may be considered to be compatible with the internal market: (…) 
aid to facilitate the development of certain economic activities or of certain economic areas, where such aid does 
not adversely affect trading conditions to an extent contrary to the common interest.’    
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undertaking the business of which is to take deposits or other repayable funds from the public 
and to grant credits for its own account.’49 The EBA regularly updates the list of national 
authorised credit institutions in the EU.   
The terms ‘deposits’ or ‘other repayable funds’ are not defined in the CRR. Therefore, the 
interpretation of this definition varies between the Member States, as well as the requirements 
to obtain a banking license.50 Certain forms of ‘deposits’ are excluded from the scheme 
coverage by Article 5(1) of the Deposit Guarantee Scheme Directive (‘DGSD’), for instance, 
deposits by investment firms.51 The clients of these entities might face risks if they were to 
encounter financial difficulties.52 
The definition of a credit institution is of great importance for a uniform application of EU 
banking law, as it determines which entities fall under its scope.53 Some establishments are 
carrying on bank-like activities, and could potentially present similar risks to the consumers 
and the financial stability, but are not considered as credit institutions within the meaning of 
Article 4(1)(1) of the CRR and therefore would not be subject to the prudential requirements. 
Shadow banking entities perform activities such as fund raising with deposit-like 
characteristics, performing maturity or liquidity transformation, allowing credit risk transfer, 
using direct or indirect leverage, without direct access to government backstops like traditional 
commercial banks.54 These entities are operating ‘in the shadows’ by circumventing existing 
rules and should be targeted by financial stability policies.  
Shadow banking refers to the system of credit intermediation that involve entities outside of the 
regular banking system. Shadow banks may pose a threat to the financial stability, by contagion 
to the regulated system. The Commission issued a Communication in 2013 addressing shadow 
                                                      
49 Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on prudential 
requirements for credit institutions and investment firms and amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012. 
50 EBA Report to the European Commission on the perimeter of credit institutions established in the Member 
States, 27 November 2014, §11.  
51 Directive 2014/49/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 on deposit guarantee 
schemes (OJ L 173, 12.6.2014). 
52 EBA Report to the European Commission on the perimeter of credit institutions established in the Member 
States, 27 November 2014, §52. 
53 Ibid., §12. 
54 Tobias Adrian, Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Report No. 664 ‘Financial Stability Policies for 
Shadow Banking,’ February 2014, p. 1. 
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banking as a new source of risk in the financial sector.55 The Commission outlines that risks of 
a systemic nature could arise from the shadow banking sector’s size and interconnectedness 
with the regulated banking sector. Liquidity creation in the shadow banking sector has effects 
on the fluctuation of the financial stability.56 The destabilisation of an important entity of the 
shadow banking system could have contagion effects on the regular banking system. The 
Commission’s approach, as presented in its Communication, is to apply similar rules to 
activities showing the same level of risk, although there are economists that are not that 
concerned. 
To that aim, the Commission, following the recommendations of the Financial Stability 
Board,57 has adopted measures such as imposing higher requirements on banks in their 
transactions with the shadow banking system or imposing more transparency in the transactions 
by collecting information. The Financial Stability Board (‘FSB’) is an international body 
established in 2009 in charge of making recommendations about the global financial system. 
The FSB coordinates supervisory regulations and policies of regulatory authorities. Increasing 
control over the shadow-banking sector would help to preserve the financial stability within the 
EU. 
3.4.2. Specific reasons for providing aid to a failing bank 
As stated in Article 18(4) of the SRM Regulation,58 a bank is deemed to be failing or likely to 
fail in one of several circumstances, notably: when the bank is unable to pay its debts or other 
liabilities when they fall due; when the assets of the entity are less than its liabilities; when 
extraordinary public financial support is required; or when the entity infringes the requirements 
for continuing authorisation in a way that would justify the withdrawal of the authorisation by 
the ECB.  
                                                      
55 Communication COM (2013) 614/3 from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament ‘Shadow 
Banking – Addressing New Sources of Risk in the Financial Sector’. 
56 Tobias Adrian, Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Report No. 664 ‘Financial Stability Policies for 
Shadow Banking’, February 2014, p. 6. 
57 Recommendations of the Financial Stability Board ‘Shadow Banking: Strengthening Oversight and Regulation’, 
27 October 2011. 
58 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 July 2014 establishing 
uniform rules and a uniform procedure for the resolution of credit institutions and certain investment firms in the 
framework of a Single Resolution Mechanism and a Single Resolution Fund and amending Regulation (EU) No 
1093/2010 (OJ L 225, 30.7.2014).  
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The failure of a bank is likely to cause a serious disturbance in a Member State’s economy. To 
preserve the financial stability of the Union, a Member State can thus decide that the failing 
credit institution is too important to collapse, as it would have severe consequences on the real 
economy and the other credit institutions, as they are intertwined. The Member States want to 
avoid a total collapse of the banking system that could lead to a sovereign default.  
State aid in the financial sector aims at correcting the negative spillover effects that the failure 
of one bank could cause on others, due to the interconnectedness of the banking system. Indeed, 
banks depend heavily on the ability to lend and borrow money to each other. The failure of one 
institution is not likely to benefit its competitors, unlike in other sectors of the economy.59 The 
collapse of a systemically important financial institution is enough to trigger a financial crisis, 
by undermining the confidence in the banking system and thus drying up the interbank sector. 
By preserving the general confidence of clients in the soundness of the banking industry, credit 
will continue to flow in the real economy and the market will continue to function properly.  
 
Providing aid to a failing bank should have the aim of protecting the interbank network and the 
depositors, not saving the bank itself. Aid does not have the purpose of maintaining artificially 
alive banks.  
It is, however, important to remember that State aid is not free and that it is financed by 
taxpayers’ money. 
3.4.3. Types of aid used to rescue and restructure credit institutions 
Ad hoc measures or general schemes were applied to credit institutions during the financial 
crisis. Rescue aid and restructuring plans were used to organise the exit in a controlled manner 
of inefficient firms from the market, leaving market shares available for viable banks.  
State subsidies in the financial sector can be granted under several forms:  
(1) State guarantees provided at preferential rates. Governments can guarantee deposits or 
other bank liabilities. A guarantee is presumed to constitute State aid when the recipient 
                                                      
59 State aid Crisis rules for the financial sector and the real economy, Study from the Directorate General for 
internal policies, June 2011, p. 22, available at  
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/201107/20110714ATT24010/20110714ATT24010EN.p
df 
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bank cannot find any private actor that would provide the same guarantee at the same 
rate. In that case, the aid amounts to the difference between the interest rate obtained 
with State guarantee, and the market interest rate without guarantee.  
(2) Recapitalisation measures consist of government capital injections to strengthen the 
capital base of the credit institution. Recapitalisation creates a capital buffer against 
future losses.60 Recapitalising a bank in difficulty will help to maintain financing flows 
to the real economy, when no private investor would have had this behaviour. The 
amount of State aid granted is the amount of the recapitalisation.  
(3) Impaired asset measures: banks hold a variety of assets, such as financial assets, loans, 
treasury bills, or intangible assets such as property or plants. An impaired asset is a 
company’s asset whose market price is lower than the value registered in the company’s 
balance sheets. Impaired asset relief measures protect the bank from losses that would 
occur because of these impaired assets. A transfer of assets above their market price 
from the balance sheets of the beneficiary bank to that of another entity called a ‘bad 
bank’, as provided by an asset relief measure, constitutes State aid. The amount of aid 
granted is the difference between the market price and the purchase price.61 Asset relief 
may also be realised through asset guarantee: the impaired assets remain on the balance 
sheets of the recipient bank, but the losses occurred are secured by the State. 
(4) Liquidity measures may be granted in the form of credit lines, loans or State deposits. 
The State provides the funding directly, rather than guaranteeing access to credit 
funds.62 
 
Quantifying the amount of aid transferred is not always easy, as the market prices can be 
distorted during financial turmoil.63 
 
3.4.4. Potential adverse effects of State aid granted to credit institutions 
 
State aid may have distortive effects, by granting an advantage to the recipient bank over its 
competitors.  In an integrated financial market, such as the European Union, the intervention of 
a national government may have adverse impacts on other Member States. Negative cross-
                                                      
60 Kelyn Bacon QC, European Union Law of State Aid, Third Edition (OUP, 2017), p. 384. 
61 Ibid., p. 371. 
62 Ibid., p. 378. 
63 Ibid., p. 371. 
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country externalities and international spillovers are justifying a supranational control of State 
aid.64 
Distortions of competitions manifest themselves inter alia in bank funding rates being 
artificially low for weak banks in countries with very high expectations that investors will be 
bailed out by the State in the end.65 
State aid measures entail potential distortions of competition by: 
(1) supporting inefficient firms: State aid measures may keep unsound banks artificially alive. 
(2) distorting dynamic incentives: State aid measures may alter the investment incentives of 
firms. 
(3) increasing market power: State aid measures may create entry barriers for non-domestic 
competitors, that do not benefit from State support. 
(4) affecting location decisions across Member States: State aid measures may alter the location 
of productive assets in the EU.  
 
Aid schemes tend to be less distortive than ad hoc measures, as they are designed to support a 
specific firm and can be used to ‘pick a winner.’66 
 
Potential distortion of competition also depends on the amount of aid granted: larger amounts 
are more likely to have distortive effects. That is the reason why aid under the de minimis 
threshold is automatically exempted, as it is presumed to have minimal effects on competition. 
To reduce the distortive effect of the aid measures, the Commission requires that State measures 
are accompanied by a restructuring plan, including burden sharing, compensatory measures and 
                                                      
64 Hans W. Friederiszick, Lars-Hendrik Röller, and Vincent Verouden, European State Aid Control: An Economic 
Framework (ed. Handbook of Antitrust Economics. Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press, 2008), Chapter 17, p. 640. 
65 State aid Crisis rules for the financial sector and the real economy, Study from the Directorate General for 
internal policies, June 2011, p. 11, available at  
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/201107/20110714ATT24010/20110714ATT24010EN.p
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66 Hans W. Friederiszick, Lars-Hendrik Röller, and Vincent Verouden, European State Aid Control: An Economic 
Framework ( ed. Handbook of Antitrust Economics. Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press, 2008), Chapter 17, p. 654. 
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the demonstration that the bank can return to long-term viability, by refocusing on its core 
activities and changing its business model. 
State aid measures may also induce moral hazard. Moral hazard arises when a party is protected 
from adverse effects that could occur because of its behaviour and is thus behaving differently 
than if that protection did not exist. For instance, State guarantee could give incentives to a 
bank to take risky investments, if the bank knows that it will eventually be backed up by the 
State.   
 
3.5. Summary  
 
State aid measures that distort competition or affect trade between Member States are in 
principle prohibited under Article 107(1) TFEU. State measures may be authorised by the 
Commission under Article 107(2) or (3) if they are compatible with the internal market. The 
discretion of the Commission when deciding on State aid cases is limited by its Guidelines 
adopted under Article 107 TFEU.  
In the financial sector, State aid measures are granted to credit institutions subject to supervisory 
requirements; some financial establishments are excluded from the scope of the prudential 
requirements legislative framework, a fact that can threaten the financial stability as turbulences 
in the shadow banking system are likely to spread in the regulated banking sector.  
State aid may be granted to banks through different means: funding guarantees, recapitalisation, 
impaired assets relief measures or liquidity measures. Granting aid to a distressed bank aims at 
maintaining financial stability and avoiding negative spillover effects on the whole banking 
system. 
State measures must be proportionate to their objective and limited to the amount necessary; 
State aid may have adverse effects such as distortion of competition or creation of moral hazard. 
The potential negative effects of State measures can be avoided through the application of 
compensatory measures, burden sharing or the obligation to demonstrate that the bank is able 
to return to long-term viability without State support. 
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4. State Aid Rules applied by the Commission during the 
Financial Crisis 
 
4.1. Overview of the Financial Crisis and main concerns raised by it 
in relation to the systemic financial stability 
4.1.1. Origins and causes of the Crisis 
 
The 2008 financial crisis is the biggest financial crisis since the Great Depression and has 
reshaped the banking sector. The primary underlying cause of the crisis is that the abundance 
of cheap credit led to asset price booms in real estate in the United States. The functioning of 
wholesale credit markets has been disrupted since mid-2007. The real estate bubble finally 
exploded, and the country saw a quick decline of the property prices, triggering the so-called 
subprime crisis.  The burst of the North Atlantic housing bubble raised concerns about the 
soundness of banks, as financial institutions had significant exposure to losses from mortgage 
defaults. The bankruptcy of the investment bank Bear Stearns in March 2008 was the first 
symptom of the premises of the crisis. The collapse of Lehman Brothers on 15 September 2008 
triggered the financial crisis. The following weeks, the US government injected billions of 
dollars into the banks.67 On the other side of the Atlantic, governments were forced to intervene 
massively through rescue plans and extended bank guarantees. Confidence in banks’ balance 
sheets dropped drastically, liquidity in the financial markets dried up, and prices collapsed for 
many assets, causing solvency issues for the banks. Indeed, the failure of one of the world’s 
largest investment bank created anxiety about subprime products of uncertain quality. Banks 
faced the need to replace a source of funding that had become unavailable: an impaired access 
to money market borrowing and the impossibility to rely on maturing bank bonds during the 
crisis.68 
 
                                                      
67 Christian Ahlborn and Daniel Piccinin, Chapter 7: The Great Recession and other mishaps: The Commission’s 
policy of restructuring aid in a time of crisis, in Research Handbook on European State Aid Law (edited by Erika 
Szyszczak, Edward Edgar Publishing, 2011), p. 124. 
68 Speech by Peter Praet, member of the Executive Board of the ECB, at the Committee on Capital Markets 
Regulation conference on The lender of last resort – an international perspective, ‘The ECB and its role as lender 
of last resort during the crisis’ Washington DC, 10 February 2016, available at 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2016/html/sp160210.en.html 
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The financial crisis has shed light on the fact that financing risky things creates a vicious circle 
of debts which can eventually lead to the failure of one bank that triggers the collapse of other 
credit institutions, and have an impact on the real economy. The financial crisis has eventually 
led to a sovereign debt crisis threatening the Euro zone. 
 
As it regards the EU, Ireland’s extension of its bank guarantees to Irish banks raised concerns 
that those State rescue measures may distort competition and put other Member States at a 
disadvantage. The Commission had to find a balance between saving a bank which equates 
under certain conditions to maintaining the financial stability within the EU and preserving fair 
competition within the EU, which is one of its roles. The Commission’s role in controlling State 
aid is of the utmost importance when it comes to preserving the banking system and the real 
economy. 
 
4.1.2. Impact of the Financial Crisis on the Financial Stability and the 
Banking Sector 
 
Systemic risk to the financial stability can be defined as the risk that the provision of necessary 
financial products and services by the financial system will be impaired to a point where 
economic growth and welfare might be affected. Systemic risk may occur because of financial 
imbalances and contagion across the market. Financial stability is reached when the risk is 
contained.69 One market-based indicator of systemic risk is the probability of default of two or 
more banking groups in the euro area.70 
 
Financial and price stability are two facets of the same coin. The ECB has the duty to maintain 
price stability across the EU, by keeping inflation at a level below 2%, and to promote the 
smooth operation of payment systems.71 The ECB has actively been supporting the 
establishment of a robust regulatory framework for financial institutions. 
                                                      
69 Financial Stability Review, document by the ECB, May 2017, p.3, available at 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/fsr/html/index.en.html 
70 Ibid., p. 85. 
71 Article 127(1) and (5) TFEU ‘(5) The ESCB shall contribute to the smooth conduct of policies pursued by the 
competent authorities relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions and the stability of the financial 
system.’ 
 28 
The main impact of the failure of banks on the real economy was the lack of liquidity. If credit 
institutions are not sound, they are not able to provide safe and stable deposits, payments and 
credit to the real economy.72 It was, therefore, essential to recover financial stability and to 
rebuild a sound banking system that can support the real economy, which is its core function. 
 
The financial crisis has caused severe damages to the banking system. There have been massive 
losses and fear that many banks might not be able to survive. Some banks have disappeared 
through bankruptcy or been nationalised.73 Almost all the Member States have granted State 
aid to their financial institutions. To prevent the collapse of the financial markets, the decisions 
authorising the grant of State aid were taken in only a couple of weeks, or even a few days, 
instead of several months as it is the case under normal circumstances.74 Cases with such an 
impact would probably have triggered the formal investigation procedure by the Commission 
if there was no urgent need to prevent a global collapse of the banking sector and thus to take 
swift decisions.  
 
The measures deployed have managed to prevent the collapse of the European financial system, 
but concerns remain about the sovereign debt in Europe and the fragility of the market.  
 
 
4.2. Phases of State Aid Control: Evolution of the Commission’s 
reaction to the Crisis 
 
The Commission applied in the first place the standard State aid guidelines for ‘rescue and 
restructuring operations’ to assess aid measures to entities in difficulty. The second step was to 
adopt a package of crisis communications; four communications during the period 2008-2009, 
with two prolongation communications, and one banking communication adopted in 2013 
introducing burden-sharing. 
 
                                                      
72 Speech by Johannes Laitenberger ‘From bail out to bail in: laying foundations for a restructured banking sector 
in Europe’ Banking Union and Competition, Universidade Católica Portuguesa, Lisbon 25 February 2016.  
73 Lehman Brothers in the US, Fortis and Dexia in Belgium and in the Netherlands in September 2008; the Anglo-
Irish Bank in the Republic of Ireland in January 2009… In total, more than 400 banks have been bailed out or 
failed in the period 2008-2010, resulting in significant depositor losses.  
74 Common Market Law Review 47 :313-318, Kluwer Law International [2010] p. 314 
 29 
4.2.1. Early stage: application of the Rescue and Restructuring Guidelines 
 
When the crisis was triggered in 2008, the Commission recognised the need for urgent action. 
The Commission had two main objectives: safeguarding the financial stability and bringing 
liquidity to the real economy. In the absence of other regulatory instruments, State aid control 
functioned as a de facto resolution framework for the financial sector during the crisis.75 The 
first step was thus to undertake rescue and restructuring plans. The second phase was to ensure 
the viability of the banks without State support. The former Commissioner Neelie Kroes noted 
thus ‘In terms of enforcement, the most crucial thing in my inbox is bank restructuring. This is 
the second stage of ‘rescue and restructuring’ aid offered in the past year. In plain English – the 
price of State support is that you must submit a restructured business to us for approval in order 
to offset the competition distortions of aid.’76 
 
4.2.1.1. The content of the 2004 Rescue and Restructuring Guidelines 
 
Rescue and restructuring (R&R) aid measures are typically assessed and approved under Article 
107(3)(c) TFEU, as granting aid for the rescue and restructuring of individual undertakings is 
considered by the Commission as ‘facilitating certain economic areas or economic activities’. 
The 2004 Rescue & Restructuring Guidelines (‘R&R Guidelines’), based on Article 107(3)(c) 
TFEU, were first used at the premises of the financial crisis to deal with the approval of rescue 
and restructuring aid to credit institutions in difficulty and including restructuring plans, as they 
apply to firms of all sector. The guidelines set out the Commission’s approach to State aid to 
firms in difficulty. Rescue aid is temporary liquidity aid, granted in the form of loan guarantees 
or loans not exceeding six months while working out a restructuring plan, with the aim to regain 
long-term viability.77 The amount of aid granted must be proportionate to what is needed to 
maintain the firm afloat.78 Before the end of the period of six months, the Member State must 
either approve a restructuring plan or a liquidation plan or ask for reimbursement of the loan.79 
                                                      
75 Speech by Gert Jan Koopman, Deputy Director-General, DG Competition, European Commission ‘Market 
based solutions to bank restructuring and the role of State Aid Control: the case of NPLs’ ECMI Annual 
Conference, Brussels, 9 November 2016, p. 1. 
76 Speech by Neelie Kroes ‘Antitrust and State Aid Control – The lessons learned’, 36th Annual Conference on 
International Antitrust Law and Policy, Fordham University, New York, 24 September 2009, p. 6. 
77 R&R Guidelines, points 15, 25(a). 
78 Ibid., point 25(d). 
79 Ibid., point 80. 
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The guidelines operate with a ‘one time, last time’ principle to avoid repeated use of State aid 
to non-viable firms and reduce moral hazard.80 
 
State aid for rescuing and restructuring institutions in difficulty has substantial distortive effects 
on competition.81 Therefore, the conditions under which it may granted are strict, and it must 
be demonstrated that the failure of the credit institution would lead to a social hardship, i.e., a 
rise in unemployment, or a market failure.82 In those cases, R&R aid would contribute to an 
objective of common interest. The restructuring plan must certify that the undertaking will 
regain long-term viability. 
 
The restructuring plan must focus on restoring the viability of the bank, and aid should not be 
used for non-core or non-viable activities.83 The 2004 R&R Guidelines include as well the 
principle that in any restructuring operation, the beneficiary bank should be obliged to finance 
at least a part of its restructuring, by selling non-core assets, and abandon loss-making 
activities.84 The Guidelines also specify that the Commission will ask for compensatory 
measures to limit distortions of competition.85 Compensatory measures may include divestment 
of assets, reductions in capacity or market presence, and reduction of entry barriers on the 
markets concerned.86 The compensatory measures should be proportionate to the distortive 
effects created by the grant of State aid, and depend on the size of the firm and its importance 
on the market.87 State aid measures to a company of bigger size are more likely to have 
distortive effects on competition than aid granted to small and medium enterprises.   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
80 Ibid., section 3.3. 
81 Ibid., point 4. 
82 Franz Jürgen Säcker, Frank Montag, European State Aid Law: a Commentary (C.H.Beck-Hart-Nomos, 2016), 
p. 47. 
83 R&R Guidelines, point 45. 
84 Ibid., points 35, 43. 
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87 R&R Guidelines, Point 40. 
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4.2.1.2. Restructuring cases prior to October 2008 
 
Ad hoc individual assistance measures were first granted to financial institutions in the EU with 
significant collateralised debt obligations risks.88 Rescue measures were applied to several 
banks, based on the R&R Guidelines and of Article 107(3)(c) TFEU. 
 
(1) Northern Rock  
Northern Rock was the UK’s 5th biggest mortgage bank that suffered severe liquidity 
difficulties in 2007 because of the on-going financial turbulences.89 Northern Rock became 
unable to meet its funding needs and requested ELA from the Bank of England in September 
2007. The news of the provision of ELA triggered a bank run, as the depositors feared they 
would suffer losses, aggravating the bank’s difficulties. The UK government decided to 
guarantee Northern Rock’s liabilities on 17 September and on 9 October 2007 and notified the 
measures to the Commission on 26 November 2007. 
 
The Commission had to assess the compatibility with the internal market of several measures: 
the provision of ELA by the Bank of England on 14 September 2007, the State guarantee for 
existing accounts granted from 17 to 20 September 2007, the extension of the ELA programme 
on 9 October 2007, and the State guarantee on new accounts from 9 October 2007. 
 
The UK claimed that the provision of ELA of 14 September 2007 lies solely on the 
responsibility of the Bank of England and therefore that it does not constitute State aid. The UK 
recognised that the other measures were State aid, but that they were consistent with the 2004 
R&R Guidelines. 
 
The Commission decided on 5 December 2007 that the measures taken from 17 to 20 September 
2007 as well as the measures decided on 9 October 2007 constitute ad hoc State aid within the 
meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU, which the UK did not notify ex-ante. The measures are 
however compatible with the internal market, as the loans and State guarantees respect the 
conditions of form and duration set out in point 25 of the R&R Guidelines. The Commission 
                                                      
88 Franz Jürgen Säcker, Frank Montag, European State Aid Law: a Commentary (C.H.Beck-Hart-Nomos, 2016), 
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89 Commission Decision of 5 December 2007 on State aid NN 70/2007 (ex CP 269/07) – United Kingdom Rescue 
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has balanced the negative social effects that the bankruptcy of the bank would cause in the 
absence of aid (in the form of job losses) and the distortions of competition that the aid could 
potentially cause. As the aid is restricted to the minimum necessary for the bank to mitigate 
liquidity shortfalls, the Commission has considered that adverse effects on trade were 
neutralised. 
 
Regarding the legal basis of the decision, the Commission recalled that an aid benefiting an 
individual bank or a single sector cannot be considered to remedy a severe disturbance, within 
the meaning of Article 107(3)(b) TFEU. The Commission decided that there was no sufficient 
evidence that the bank-run would have caused a systemic crisis. The decision was thus adopted 
under Article 107(3)(c) TFEU and the R&R Guidelines. 
 
As regards the ELA granted by the Bank of England on 14 September 2007, the Commission 
notes that the liquidity assistance was provided on the initiative of the central bank, when 
Northern Rock was solvent, against high-quality collaterals and at a penalty rate interest, to 
mitigate liquidity issues.90 This measure does thus not constitute State aid within the meaning 
of Article 107(1) TFEU. 
 
(2) Sachsen LB 
In the case of Sachsen LB of June 2008,91 the Commission decided to open the formal 
investigation procedure because the liquidity measure seemed to confer a selective advantage 
upon the bank, stating that ‘it being unlikely that a market economy investor would have granted 
the credit facility to Sachsen LB on the same conditions as the banking pool.’92 The German 
State argued that the liquidity measure would have been provided by a market investor, as the 
remuneration was above the market standards. In any event, even if the liquidity measures 
involved State aid elements, it constitutes rescue aid compatible with the R&R Guidelines as it 
is similar to a loan, not structural, and limited to six months.93 
 
                                                      
90 Ibid., para 32. 
91 Commission Decision of 4 June 2008 on State aid C 9/08 (ex NN 8/08, CP 244/07) implemented by Germany 
for Sachsen LB (notified under document number C(2008) 2269), 2009/341/EC (OJ L 104/34). 
92 Ibid., para 47. 
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The Commission decided that the liquidity facility and the guarantee granted to Sachsen LB in 
connection with its sale by the German State constituted State aid within the meaning of Article 
107(1) TFEU, as they would not have been provided by a private market investor, and that the 
measures were compatible with the internal market. As regards the legal basis of the approval 
decision, the Commission decided that it could not be Article 107(3)(b) TFEU, as the problems 
encountered by Sachsen LB were peculiar to the company and not of a systemic nature. The 
Commission stated thus that ‘the information provided by the German authorities has not 
convinced the Commission that the systemic effects that might have resulted from a bankruptcy 
of Sachsen LB could have reached a size constituting ‘a serious disturbance in the economy’ of 
Germany within the meaning of Article 87(3)(b). Therefore, the present case must be regarded 
as based on individual problems, and thus requires tailor-made remedies, which can be 
addressed under the rules on firms in difficulty.’94 Instead, the Commission considered that the 
legal basis of the decision would be Article 107(3)(c) TFEU. 
 
About the rescue aid provided in the form of liquidity support facility to Sachsen LB, the 
Commission took the view that it was compliant with point 25 of the R&R Guidelines, as the 
measure was restricted to the amount needed to maintain the firm in business for a period of six 
months and does not have negative spill-over effects on other Member States. The ‘one time, 
last time’ principle set out in the R&R Guidelines was also respected, as the bank did not receive 
rescue or restructuring aid in the past. 
 
The Commission also approved the restructuring aid in the form of State guarantee and the 
restructuring plan submitted by the German State that included asset divestment, compensatory 
measures and behavioural commitments such as focusing on core activities. The investigation 
convinced the Commission that the restructuring aid would restore the viability of the bank. 
The compensatory measures entail a clear reduction of Sachsen LB’s activities and the 
divestment of one of its valuable subsidiaries and were considered sufficient to reduce the 
distortive effects of the State aid measures. The plan also foresaw that the bank would make a 
significant contribution of its own, in compliance with the R&R Guidelines, i.e., at least 50% 
of the restructuring costs.  
 
                                                      
94 Ibid., para 95. 
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The Commission did thus not apply Article 107(3)(b) in these cases, considering that the 
Member States did not present enough evidence that not granting State aid to these banks would 
cause serious potential disturbance of the economy.95 
4.2.2. Adoption of the Crisis Framework: need for deep restructuring  
 
4.2.2.1. The common action plan 
 
State measures were at first individual, but systemically important financial institutions were 
concerned, and the whole banking system was threatened. The Member States started to adopt 
general aid schemes as of October 2008. During the Ecofin Council of 7 October 2008 in 
Luxembourg, the Member States agreed on a common action plan.96 EU authorities decided to 
coordinate their endeavours to fight against the impact of the financial crisis on the banking 
sector, as systemically important banks are often cross-border entities and their failure is likely 
to cause disturbances in several member states. The financial stability of the whole EU was 
threatened, requiring common action that would be guided by principles such as avoidance of 
negative spill-over effects, protection of the interests of taxpayers, or burden placed on the 
shareholders.  
 
Commission reacted to the announcement of massive recapitalisations through the adoption of 
a comprehensive framework on the consequences of support to the financial sector. The 
Commission had committed during the Ecofin Council to create a new framework to assess the 
compatibility of the aid granted during the crisis, to enhance transparency and make it possible 
to take swift decisions, while preserving legal certainty. The Commission adopted five new 
communications and two prolongation communications based on Article 107(3)(b) TFEU, in 
which different issues are addressed. Aid assessed under Article 107(3)(b) is used to remedy a 
serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State, as the failure of systemically important 
credit institutions would lead to such a disturbance. The Court has ruled that a serious 
disturbance in the economy of a Member State entails that the entire economy of that Member 
                                                      
95 Franz Jürgen Säcker, Frank Montag, European State Aid Law: a Commentary (C.H.Beck-Hart-Nomos, 2016), 
p. 1311. 
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State is affected, not only a part of it.97 Until the financial crisis, Article 107(3)(b) had never 
been used to assess State measures granted to a financial institution.98 
 
Article 107(3)(c) TFEU in conjunction with the R&R Guidelines was no longer the appropriate 
legal basis to assess State aid measures in the context of the crisis. Articles 107(3)(c) and 
107(3)(b) TFEU have different objectives: Article 107(3)(c) and the R&R Guidelines concern 
rescue and restructuring under normal market conditions.99 As of October 2008, the primary 
purpose of State aid measures is now to maintain the economies of the Member States afloat, 
not to rescue individual institutions or foster development in certain areas. 
 
The Crisis Communications reflect the evolution of the crisis and the market conditions. The 
Commission based its analysis of the compatibility of the State measures on three principles:100 
 
(1) The viability of the recipient bank: The Commission wanted to avoid keeping non-viable 
banks artificially alive. Adjustments of the bank’s business model can be necessary to that aim. 
(2) Burden sharing: Moral hazard is one factor that explains why banks had risky behaviours, 
knowing that they were backed up by the States. Placing the burden on the bank ensures that 
the board directors would act as ‘prudent persons,’ be less likely to make risky investments and 
ensure that the aid is not used to finance activities non-linked to the restructuring plan.  
(3) Limited distortions to competition: It is the duty of the Commission to establish a level 
playing field within the EU, and a fortiori between aided and non-aided banks. Maintenance of 
competition can be ensured through various compensatory measures and behavioural 
commitments from the aided banks. 
 
Under the Crisis Framework, aid to banks in difficulty was thus approved under Article 
107(3)(b) as aid to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy. The Commission took 
advantage of the different legal basis to produce four new bank-specific rescue and restructuring 
guidelines in seven months, as the two provisions have different objectives.  
                                                      
97 Joined Cases C-57/00 P and C-61/00 P, Freistaat Sachsen and Others v Commission [2003] ECR I-09975, para 
97. 
98 Franz Jürgen Säcker, Frank Montag, European State Aid Law: a Commentary (C.H.Beck-Hart-Nomos, 2016), 
p. 1311. 
99 Ibid., p. 1312. 
100 See Communication from the Commission – The application of State aid rules to measures taken in relation to 
financial institutions in the context of the current global financial crisis, O.J 2008, C 270/08, point 31. 
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4.2.2.2. The 2008 Banking Communication  
 
The 2008 Banking Communication was adopted on 13 October 2008.101 The Commission 
invokes for the first time Article 107(3)(b) TFEU to address the systemic crisis.102 
 
The Banking Communication provides that both ad hoc measures and general schemes can be 
used at the same time.103 Recourse to Article 107(3)(b) TFEU is possible as long as the crisis 
justifies it.104 Therefore, the Commission requires that the Member States carry out a review of 
the general schemes at least every six months.105 The 2008 Banking Communication makes a 
distinction between illiquid but fundamentally sound banks and distressed banks.106 
 
The Banking Communication provides criteria for the assessment of general support schemes 
such as guarantees covering the liabilities of financial institutions, recapitalisation of financial 
institutions, controlled winding-up of financial institutions and provision of other forms of 
liquidity assistance. 
 
Under the Banking Communication, a general scheme including State guarantee or 
recapitalisation measures is deemed compatible with the internal market if it respects several 
conditions: 
(1) The eligibility criteria for the scheme must be objective, transparent and non-
discriminatory.107 
(2) The duration and scope of the scheme should be limited to the minimum necessary. If 
the Member State commits to reviewing the scheme every six months, the aid can be 
authorised for a period longer than six months, up to two years in principle.108 
                                                      
101 Communication from the Commission – The application of State aid rules to measures taken in relation to 
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Communication’. 
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(3) The amount of aid must be limited to the strict minimum. The beneficiaries of the aid 
or the private financial sector at large must contribute significantly to the costs of the 
general scheme.109 
(4) Negative distortive effects on non-beneficiary banks must be avoided. The Member 
State must include mechanisms to that aim, such as behavioural constraints.110 
(5) When the scheme is applied to an individual case, the emergency rescue measures must 
be followed by a restructuring or liquidation plan.111 
 
As regards the winding-up of a credit institution, the 2008 Banking Communication states that 
the liquidation phase should be temporally limited and that the banking license should be 
withdrawn as soon as possible,112 and that the protection of the financial stability may imply 
that State aid measures are used to reimburse creditors of the insolvent bank.113  
 
As it relates to the provision of ELA by a national central bank, the Banking Communication 
considers that it may not amount to State aid, provided that the recipient bank is solvent, that 
the liquidity facility is secured by collaterals to which haircut is applied, that a penal interest 
rate is applied, and that the initiative of the central bank is not guaranteed by the State.114 
The Banking Communication provides that Commission decisions regarding the compatibility 
of aid schemes may be taken over 24 hours, considering the need for urgent action. 
 
4.2.2.3. The Recapitalisation Communication 
 
The Recapitalisation Communication of 5 December 2008 followed.115 The Recapitalisation 
Communication details the compatibility assessment of bank recapitalisation with State aid 
rules.  
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The Recapitalisation Communication restates that recapitalisation measures may have 
distortive effects on competition and that a balance must be found between these effects and 
the objective to restore the financial stability.116 To that aim, capital injections should be 
temporary and remunerated based on market prices, to give the incentive to the bank to repay 
the aid as soon as possible. The Recapitalisation Communication provides that financially 
sound banks may be entitled to rates below the market of recapitalisation, based on the 
recommendations of the ECB.117 This Communication thus emphasises the distinction between 
sound and unsound banks, as was made in the 2008 Banking Communication. Recapitalisation 
of unsound banks is subject to higher requirements.118 
 
About the risk profile of the bank, the Recapitalisation Communication develops some 
indicators such as capital adequacy (evaluation of the bank’s exposure to credit or liquidity 
risks, the quality of its assets, and its business model strategy); size of the recapitalisation; and 
the current rating of the bank (a rating of A or above by a Rating Agency being an indicator of 
a low-risk profile).119 
 
4.2.2.4. The Impaired Assets Communication 
 
The Impaired Assets Communication was adopted on 25 February 2009 and substantiates the 
two previous crisis communications.120 This Communication presents a methodology for 
Member States who wish to implement asset relief measures. One reason for the lack of 
liquidity in the banking sector since the beginning of the crisis is the uncertainty about the value 
of impaired assets and the quality of bank balance sheets.121  
 
The Impaired Assets Communication states that an application for an asset relief measure 
should contain disclosure of the correct valuation of the assets covered by the measure and the 
potential losses, followed by an assessment of the bank’s balance sheet and its viability.122 Any 
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transfer of assets at a higher price than their market value, achieving the relief effect, will 
constitute State aid. Impaired asset relief programmes should be limited to six months and 
should contain appropriate remuneration for the State, through claw-back clauses.123 
 
Toxic assets, for instance, US mortgage backed securities, have triggered the financial crisis 
and are as such eligible for asset relief measures.124 The Communication provides guidance as 
to the identification of eligible assets, based on opinions of experts, that can be found in the 
annexes to the Communication.125 
The Impaired Assets Communication specifies that long-term viability means that the bank can 
survive without State support and to redeem any State aid granted.126 Need for restructuring is 
presumed if the bank cannot survive without State support. The Communication provides that 
the Member State shall commit to present a reorganisation plan or a viability review for each 
recipient bank within three months after the approval of the scheme or individual measure.127 
Finally, the Communication stipulates that in-depth restructuring will be required if the bank 
has already received State aid (except participation in a guarantee scheme), or if the aid received 
exceeds 2% of the bank’s risk-weighted assets.128 
 
4.2.2.5. Financial Restructuring Communication 
 
The Restructuring Communication of 23 July 2009 is the fourth communication of the Crisis 
Framework.129 The Communication explains how the Commission examines restructuring 
plans during the financial crisis, in the light of the systemic role of the banking sector in the 
real economy. It recalls that when a bank is granted State aid, in whatever form, the Member 
State should submit a viability review or a restructuring plan for the credit institution.130  
 
                                                      
123 A clawback mechanism is a provision of a contract that requires the beneficiary to redeem the State capital 
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124 Ibid., point 32. 
125 Ibid., Annex 3. 
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A restructuring plan should contain the causes of the bank’s difficulties, its business model and 
show how the bank will overcome them and regain viability without State support. The plan 
should include comparison with other possibilities. In case return to long-term viability is not 
an option, the plan should present the way the bank will be wound-up, as non-viable players 
should not remain on the market.131  
 
Viability is reached when a bank is able to cover all its costs and to compete on the market, 
under normal conditions, and under stress testing. The restructuring plan should not be longer 
than five years.132 
 
As regards the potential distortion of competition, the Commission will assess the amount of 
State aid in absolute terms and in relation to the weight of risked assets of the recipient bank. 
The Commission will then analyse the likely effects of the aid on the market. The compensatory 
measures applied (assets divestment, behavioural constraints, appropriate remuneration of the 
State) should not hinder the bank from regaining viability.133 
 
4.2.2.6. The 2013 Banking Communication 
The 2013 Banking Communication was adopted on 30 July 2013 to replace the 2008 Banking 
Communication and was designed to harmonise burden-sharing for ailing banks across the 
EU.134 
As of 2013, the Commission considered that the serious disturbance in the economy of the 
Member States and the spillover risks stemming from it were still justifying the use of Article 
107(3)(b) TFEU as legal basis for State aid approval. The 2013 Banking Communication was 
thus adopted on this basis. This Communication helps to the transition from the Crisis 
Framework to the recovery and resolution directive.135 
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The 2013 Banking Communication points out that the Commission will assess whether the 
difficulties encountered by the banks stem from the sovereign crisis, and not from unreasonable 
risk-taking behaviour.136 As it relates to burden-sharing, the previous communications did not 
set up any threshold, specifying only that the recipient bank should contribute as much as 
possible to the restructuring costs, and creditors were not involved, as confidence in the banking 
sector first needed to be restored, to ensure financial stability.137 The fact that the Crisis 
Framework did not set up any minimum amount for burden-sharing led to disparities among 
the Member States, threatening the integrity of the single market in financial services, and the 
taxpayers have suffered from repeated bail-outs.138 
The 2013 Banking Communication provides therefore that burden-sharing measures should be 
applied before granting any restructuring aid, regardless of the solvency of the bank. By 2013, 
there is less need for rescue aid than in 2008, and the Communication provides that aid in the 
form of recapitalisation and impaired assets measure will only be granted once a restructuring 
plan has been adopted in compliance with the Restructuring Communication, as the use of 
general schemes over ad hoc measures have resulted in high bills for taxpayers.139 The 
Communication specifies however that an exception can be made to this requirement when the 
financial stability is threatened; aid measures may be granted if the supervisor of the bank would 
be forced to withdraw its banking license immediately, in the absence of such measures.140 In 
that case, the rescue measures must be notified ex ante to the Commission and must comply 
with the Recapitalisation and Impaired Assets Communications. 
Burden sharing entail contribution by hybrid capital holders and subordinated debt holders 
before any State aid can be granted.141 The Banking Communication also provides for capital 
                                                      
2012/30/EU and 2013/36/EU, and Regulations (EU) No 1093/2010 and (EU) No 648/2012, of the European 
Parliament. 
136 Ibid., point 9.  
137 Ibid., point 17. 
138 Ibid., point 18. 
139 Ibid., point 23. 
140 Ibid., point 50. 
141 Shareholders own shares of the stock (equity) of a company. Debt holders hold bonds and receive interest 
payments as well as the return of the principal. Subordinated debt ranks after other debts in a liquidation. Hybrid 
capital holders hold hybrid securities that include elements of equity and debt, such as convertible bonds; these 
bonds can be converted to stock shares at a set price. Write-down is used to reduce the value of an asset in the 
balance sheet, when the market value of the asset has decreased; write-off is used to eliminate the asset from the 
balance sheet. 
 42 
raising measures. If the bank does not meet the minimum capital requirements, subordinated 
debts must be converted or written down.142 
In the Kotnik case, delivered on 19 July 2016, the Grand Chamber of the Court ruled that the 
2013 Banking Communication was binding on the Commission; meaning that if a Member 
State notifies an intended State aid measure that complies with the Guidelines, the Commission 
should authorise the aid scheme.143 Besides, the Court stated that the Banking Communication 
is not binding on Member States.144 About the requirement of burden sharing on the 
shareholders and creditors as a condition for authorising an aid scheme, the Court ruled that 
this measure is likely to reduce the amount of funding needed. Therefore, the Commission had 
the competence to adopt such measure, under its mandate to assess the compatibility of State 
aid with the internal market.145 Since shareholders are liable for the debts of the bank up to the 
amount of its capital, the fact that the Banking Communication requires that the shareholders 
should contribute to the absorption of the losses suffered by the bank cannot be regarded as 
affecting their right to property in a disproportionate manner.146 
4.2.3. Application by the Commission of the Crisis Framework in the Case 
Law 
 
Under the Crisis Framework, 112 banks in the EU have received State aid in the form of 
individual ad hoc measures.147 
 
1) Commission decision under the 2008 Banking Communication: the Fortis Bank case 
Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands have granted a package of aid to banks of the group 
Fortis between 29 September and 5 October 2008, Fortis Bank and Fortis Bank Luxembourg.148 
The Commission has assessed and approved the aid granted by the Member States under the 
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2008 Banking Communication, on 3 December 2008.149 The measures were granted in the form 
of liquidity assistance, capital injections, loans, impaired assets relief measures, partial 
nationalisation and sale of 75% of Fortis Bank to the group BNP Paribas. 
 
In the decision, the Commission describes Fortis Bank’s difficulties as being the result of the 
subprime crisis, lack of liquidity on the interbank market, loss of confidence in the banking 
sector and the acquisition by Fortis of ABN AMRO. Fortis Bank found it almost impossible to 
borrow money. The Commission assessed the various measures first in the meaning of Article 
107(1) TFEU and found that the capital injection by Belgium constitutes State aid, as the 
government did not act as a private investor, the aid was granted through State resources, it 
distorts the competition by favouring the bank and affects the trade between Member States, as 
Fortis Bank is active in several Member States.150 The same conclusion was drawn regarding 
the loan granted by Luxembourg to Fortis.151 
 
Regarding the liquidity assistance provided by the Belgian central bank, the Commission found 
that it did not respect the conditions set out in the 2008 Banking Communication (notably, that 
the bank was not solvent) and therefore that it constitutes State aid.152 
 
On 5 October 2008, three transactions were concluded, including the sale of 75% of Fortis Bank 
to BNP Paribas. The Commission took the view that the sale was realised at market price, as 
no other private investor was interested, and therefore that it does not constitute State aid.153  
 
As it relates to the legal basis of the assessment of the compatibility of the aid elements of the 
measures with the internal market, the Commission considers, based on the size of Fortis Bank 
and on the exceptional market circumstances, that the aid seeks to prevent the failure of the 
bank, which would cause a serious disturbance in the economy of Belgium and Luxembourg. 
To that extent, the appropriate legal basis for the analysis is Article 107(3)(b) TFEU.154 
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Lastly, the Commission assessed the compatibility of the aid measures under the 2008 Banking 
Communication. The Commission decided that the measures were well-targeted to restore 
Fortis’ long-term viability, especially the sale to BNP Paribas which is financially sound.155 
The capital injections by Belgium and Luxembourg were also considered essential to stop the 
liquidity problems aggravated by the bank run encountered.156 With regard to the contribution 
of the bank, the Commission notes that Fortis had attempted to resolve its problems through 
assets and subsidiaries divestment.157 As regards distortions of competition, the Commission 
considers that the sale of its subsidiary made Fortis Bank significantly smaller, limiting thus 
the effects of the aid on competition, and that the sale of a part of the bank to a competitor is a 
form of compensatory measure.158 The aid measures granted were thus considered compatible 
with the internal market by the Commission, as the conditions set out in the 2008 Banking 
Communication were fulfilled. 
 
2) Commission decision under the 2008 Banking Communication, the Impaired Asset 
Communication, and the Restructuring Communication: the ING case 
 
On 18 November 2009, the Commission approved a restructuring plan for the ING bank 
including an illiquid asset back-up facility granted by the Dutch State.159 The Commission had 
previously authorised recapitalisation, liabilities guarantee, and impaired assets measures for 
the ING bank for a period of 6 months.  
The Dutch authorities have then submitted a restructuring plan of five years to the Commission 
on 12 May 2009, subsequently amended and complemented.  
ING has benefited from three aid measures from the Dutch State: capital injection, impaired 
assets relief, and State guarantees over liabilities. The first measure allowed the bank to increase 
its Core Tier 1 capital by 10 billion euros.160 In the restructuring plan, the Netherlands have 
amended the repayment terms resulting in an additional advantage for ING; the State justified 
it by the fact that the repayment conditions are now aligned on those of other capital 
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injections.161  
The impaired assets measure includes a claw back mechanism.162 The guarantee measures are 
part of the restructuring plan but will be notified separately to the Commission.163 
As regards the restructuring plan, ING commits to make a number of divestments and to 
simplify the group, in order to reduce the costs, as well as to reduce risk-taking investments and 
adhere to an acquisition ban. ING has submitted a base and a stress scenario showing its ability 
to return to long-term viability.   
The Commission chose to open the formal investigation procedure, as it had doubts regarding 
the compatibility of the impaired assets measure with the Impaired Assets Communication, 
with regard to valuation and burden sharing.164  
The Commission has found previously that the capital injection constitutes aid within the 
meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU, amounting to the sum of the recapitalisation, which is 10 
billion euros. The impaired assets measure constitutes aid as well; the aid amount results from 
the difference between the purchase price and the market price. The Dutch guarantee scheme 
from which ING benefits is also State aid, as the guarantees were granted at a time where 
funding was hard to raise, and a private investor would not have granted such guarantees.165 
The Commission applied Article 107(3)(b) TFEU when assessing the compatibility of the 
measures, accepting that ING is a systemically important bank and that its failure would have 
severe repercussion on the economy of the Netherlands and of other Member States.166  As 
regards the compatibility of the impaired assets measure, the terms relating to valuation of the 
assets and to burden sharing having been modified, the Commission found it to be compatible 
with the Impaired Assets Communication and thus with the internal market.167 
As it relates to the compatibility of the restructuring aid, the Commission assessed it under the 
Restructuring Communication to make sure that the bank is able to regain long-term viability 
without State support. Long-term viability entails that aid is redeemed over time or adequately 
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remunerated.168 The Commission considers in the present case that the restructuring plan 
demonstrates that ING would be viable even under stress test. The plan further illustrates that 
ING has learnt lessons from the crisis, by getting away from risky activities and cutting on its 
remuneration policy. Furthermore, the Commission notes that the plan contains an adequate 
burden-sharing: ING will pay an appropriate remuneration for the capital injections, and capital 
raising amongst shareholders.169 The Commission notes that the amount of aid granted to ING 
is significant, which means that the plan should entail consisting compensatory measures.170 
The plan indeed involves behaviour measures to address distortions of competition, such as 
reduction of the balance sheet, and several divestments that will reduce the presence of the bank 
on the market.  
The Commission thus concludes that the impaired assets measure and the restructuring aid are 
compatible with the internal market, pursuant to Article 107(3)(b) TFEU. 
 
4.2.4. Analysis 
 
 
The Communications of the Crisis Framework were all adopted on the basis of Article 
107(3)(b) TFEU, showing that the Commission recognised the severity of the crisis in 
comparison to cases dealt under the R&R Guidelines prior to October 2008.  
The four first communications distinguish between ‘fundamentally sound’ and ‘distressed’ 
credit institutions. The Commission highlights that fundamentally sound banks suffer only from 
liquidity issues stemming from the financial crisis, whereas distressed banks are non-viable and 
unable to regain long-term viability, because of risky business strategies or inefficient business 
model.171 The 2008 Banking Communication provides for different requirements for State aid 
approval depending on the viability of the ban; fundamentally sound bank have easier access 
to aid, presenting a lower risk profile. 
 
The five communications point out that the criteria for granting State aid should be transparent 
and non-discriminatory. They emphasise the fact that aid must be limited to the amount 
                                                      
168 Ibid., point 121. 
169 Ibid., points 133, 136. 
170 Ibid., point 142. 
171 Franz Jürgen Säcker, Frank Montag, European State Aid Law: a Commentary (C.H.Beck-Hart-Nomos, 2016), 
p. 1309. 
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necessary to safeguard financial stability and bring liquidity to the real economy while 
minimising costs to taxpayers. They also always point out to the fact that State aid is 
competition distortive by nature and lead to moral hazard. Against that background, the Crisis 
Framework contains requirements for compensatory measures. The importance of the 
compensatory measures depends on the size of the potential distortion effects that the aid could 
have; in general, the size of the institution, its capital shortfalls and the amount of aid granted 
are the criteria used to assess the potential negative effects that an aid measure could have. The 
compensatory measures take different forms, such as behavioural constraints (prohibition of 
aggressive commercial practices, reduction of the bank’s balance sheets, focus on core assets, 
assets divestment) and ensuring adequate State remuneration of the aid. The behavioural 
constraints have the effect of restricting competition among banks on the market by limiting 
the bank’s ability to lend.  
 
As regards burden-sharing, the four first communications preconize adequate own contribution 
‘the bank should contribute as much as possible,’ but do not contain any fixed input as it was 
the case in the R&R Guidelines, which provides that the contribution should amount to 50% of 
the restructuring costs. The four first communications do not contain any obligation for the 
creditors to participate to the costs, as was then provided for in the 2013 Banking 
Communication; the objective at the beginning of the crisis was to restore confidence in the 
banking sector, so lending funding to the real economy would continue. Bailing-in deposits at 
the start of the crisis would probably have undermined even more confidence in the banking 
system. The 2013 Banking Communication points out that application of burden-sharing 
decreases the need for compensatory measures, as burden-sharing diminishes moral hazard. 
 
The 2008 Banking Communication and the Restructuring Communication state that a 
restructuring or liquidation plan must be presented for distressed banks as the counterpart of 
government support, to make sure no banks are artificially kept alive. The measures or general 
scheme should be reviewed every six months at least, to ensure that application of Article 
107(3)(b) TFEU is still necessary to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy.  The 2013 
Banking Communication obliges the State to present a restructuring plan or viability review of 
the bank before any grant of State aid in the form of recapitalisation or impaired assets 
measures, regardless of the solvency state of the bank, except if the aid measures are absolutely 
necessary to safeguard the financial stability. 
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The Communications were designed so as to ensure transparency of the criteria and allow for 
swift action to be taken; their annexes contain a methodology for the Member States to follow 
for when they notify a scheme or individual measure to the Commission, notably in the 
Restructuring Communication. The Member States know precisely with which criteria the aid 
should comply, and that allowed the Commission to approve the State measures presented in 
very limited periods of time. 
 
The coordinated approach to State aid during the crisis had the aim to limit spillover effects 
stemming from the failure of cross-border banks, as well as ensuring consistency to protect the 
single market in financial services. The Crisis Framework was only applied to financial 
institutions, to remedy the exceptional circumstances on the market during the crisis. The 2013 
Banking Communication was adopted in the course of the transition from the Crisis Framework 
to the creation of the Banking Union. 
 
4.3. Summary 
 
The 2008 financial crisis has reshaped the banking sector, that was forced to adapt to the lack 
of liquidity caused by a loss of confidence in the system and the reluctance of banks to lend.  
Member States were compelled to take actions, to grant restructuring aid to distressed banks, 
but also to provide liquidity to fundamentally sound banks.  
State aid measures are taken at national level but coordinated at EU level. The Commission has 
been quite flexible when enacting the Crisis Framework and assessing the State measures by, 
i.e., not providing for any contribution threshold, or not requiring that a Member State should 
present a restructuring or viability plan before granting restructuring aid; the aim was at first to 
preserve the immediate financial stability rather the long-term sustainability of the banks.  The 
2013 Banking Communication strengthens and coordinates burden-sharing across the EU and 
states that before granting aid in the form of recapitalisation or impaired assets measures 
(measures that have large distortion potential effects), the Member State shall present a 
restructuring plan for the recipient bank. 
 
The main phases of State aid control in the Banking Sector during the Financial Crisis have 
thus been: 
-the period prior October 2008, when all the cases were dealt with under Article 107(3)(c) 
TFEU and the R&R Guidelines; 
 49 
-the period from October 2008 to February 2009, when the Commission recognised the risk of 
serious disturbance that could arise from the failure of a systemically important and applied 
Article 107(3)(b) TFEU to approve ad hoc individual measures and general schemes;  
-the period from February 2009 to July 2009 in which the Commission started to assess 
restructuring plans for a significant number of aid recipient banks and to place importance on 
the long-term viability of the banks; 
-the period from July 2009 to December 2009, when the Commission started to apply its new 
Financial Crisis Restructuring Communication, which increased the restructuring obligations 
on aid recipient banks; 
-the application as of 2013 of the new Banking Communication, as a transition to the new State 
aid rules of the Banking Union, and the emphasis on burden-sharing by shareholders and 
subordinated creditors. 
 
 
5. The effects of State aid control applied during the financial 
crisis 
 
5.1. The effects of the crisis on sovereign debt 
 
Between October 2008 and 31 December 2012, Member States have granted 591.9 billion euros 
of capital support (recapitalisation and asset relief measures) to the financial sector.172 The 
measures reached a peak in 2009, before decreasing progressively. 22 Member States have 
provided aid to their financial sector.173 The State aid used to rescue the banking sector 
amounted to 10% of EU GDP.174 The crisis has had a significant impact on gross public debt 
in the EU. The average increase in gross debt for the EU has been 23 % of GDP in the period 
2008- 2010. Public debt resulted from State interventions.175 Greece and Ireland have granted 
                                                      
172 Press release ‘State aid: Commission's new on-line state aid benchmarking tool shows less aid to banks’ 
Brussels, 20 December 2013. 
173 Competition State aid brief, Occasional papers by the Competition Directorate–General of the European 
Commission ’State aid to European banks: returning to viability’, February 2015, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/csb/csb2015_001_en.pdf 
174 Commission Staff Working Paper ‘The effects of temporary State aid rules adopted in the context of the 
financial and economic crisis’, October 2011, p. 6. 
175 Common Market Law Review 47 :313-318, Kluwer Law International [2010] p. 318. 
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the equivalent of more than 8% of the total assets of their national credit institutions in aid.176 
By the end of 2008, some countries were already in recession. The EU GDP growth dropped to 
-5% in 2009.177 The financial crisis led to a sovereign debt crisis affecting Greece, Ireland, 
Portugal, and Cyprus.  
 
5.2. The effects of the Crisis Framework  
 
The crisis has been contained to some extent by massive government action. Measures taken 
by the authorities have allowed the banking sector to return to its regular activity in 2010 and 
avoided a systemic collapse of the system. Granting liquidity measures in a controlled manner 
prevented bank runs, and at the same time, financial stability was preserved from the risk of 
credit crunch. 
 
The risk of default of systemically important financial institutions has been circumvented, and 
lending to the real economy has resumed. State aid control has been used as a de facto resolution 
authority, in the absence of a common resolution authority. The legal framework put in place 
by the Commission allowed it to clear emergency State aid measures in a consistent way and 
accelerated the decision-making process while ensuring legal certainty. Consequently, in most 
cases, the Commission did not raise objections. The Commission adopted a negative decision 
in one single case and ordered recovery of the aid.178 Commission’s swift action to create the 
Crisis Framework allowed for the State aid rules enshrined in the Treaties to be applied. As of 
2010, the Commission started to strengthen the conditions to grant aid, as the market conditions 
improved. The Crisis Communications as applied in the case law ensured that aid was not 
granted for free, as the aid schemes or individual measures had to entail adequate remuneration 
of the State or redemption of the capital by clawback mechanism, and that negative effects on 
competition were limited, by imposing compensatory measures. Moral hazard was fought by 
imposing measures regarding governance of the credit institutions, i.e., measures concerning 
the remuneration or change of the management. 
 
                                                      
176 Commission Staff Working Paper ‘The effects of temporary State aid rules adopted in the context of the 
financial and economic crisis’, October 2011, p. 11. 
177 Ibid., p. 19. 
178 Case C33/2009, Restructuring of Banco Privado Português (OJ L 159, 17.6.2011). 
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In most Member States, the aid measures were concentrated only on a few institutions, the ‘too 
big to fail’ ones, which are more likely to create negative spillover effects but also to have a 
negative impact on competition. State aid control could not suffice to eradicate distortions of 
competition totally.179 The most efficient tool to minimise them was the imposition of high 
requirements for restructuring plans. Non-aided banks even seem to have performed better 
during 2008-2010 than aided banks, in terms of profitability and asset growth.180 Commission 
reports show nonetheless that the restructuring plans approved by the Commission have helped 
to save many banks.181 A bank was deemed viable was it was able to redeem the aid received. 
 
As a reaction to the crisis, the EU has launched a reform of the supervision and regulation 
mechanisms in the banking sector, giving rise to the Banking Union.  
 
6. Preservation of the systemic financial stability post-crisis 
6.1. Main issues to address 
 
The management of the crisis was hampered by an incomplete institutional euro area and by 
the lack of an integrated banking system. The crisis has led to a fragmentation of the financial 
sector. The Banking Union was necessary to complete the European Monetary Union. The 
Banking Union encompasses automatically the interdependent Euro area countries sharing a 
common currency, but is open to other nations of the EU willing to participate.  
 
The objective of the Banking Union is to break the vicious circle between bank debts and 
sovereign debts, through the shift from bail-out to bail-in. Burden-sharing in a bank failure aims 
at preventing moral hazard. The Banking Union aims at restoring consumer confidence in the 
banking sector and protecting taxpayers. The rules led down must be rigorously implemented 
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to keep the balance.182 Banks must adjust to more demanding regulatory and supervisory 
standards, with increased capital and liquidity requirements.183 
 
The previous banking legislation was based on Directives, leaving some autonomy to the 
Member States as for how to implement them. This left autonomy has led to disparities between 
the national banking systems, for instance as it regards the resolution of failing credit 
institutions. The divergence between the national resolution procedures was a source of conflict 
when it came to resolution of transnational entities. Cross-border banks cannot be resolved 
properly if there is no harmonised legislation governing their liquidation.  
 
6.2. Creation of the Banking Union: from bail-out to bail-in 
 
6.2.1. The new framework 
 
The Banking Union is based on a single rulebook for all financial actors in the EU, with the 
aim to foster the integration of the Euro area banking system. The Banking Union consists of 
three pillars: The Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM’), the Single Resolution Mechanism 
(‘SRM’) and the common European Deposit Insurance Scheme (‘EDIS’).   
The framework aims at preventing financial crisis in the first place, and organise the orderly 
winding-up of credit institutions in difficulty in the second place, without having to rely on 
taxpayers’ money and ensuring that depositors are protected.  
 
6.2.1.1. The Single Rulebook 
 
The purpose of the Single Rulebook is to ensure a consistent application of the banking 
legislation throughout the Euro zone. The legislative framework comprises the Capital 
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Requirements Directive ‘CRD IV’,184 read in conjunction with the Capital Requirements 
Regulation ‘CRR’,185 the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive ‘BRRD’186, and the Deposit 
Guarantee Schemes Directive ‘DGSD.’187  
 
(1) The CRD IV/CRR package sets in place prudential requirements to which credit 
institutions are subject, such as the obligation to have a buffer capital for all credit 
institutions of the Euro area.188 
(2) The BRRD organises the resolution of distressed credit institutions, based on the bail-
in principle and early interventions.189 Before the adoption of the BRRD, there were no 
specific harmonised resolution rules at EU level for credit institutions; failure of banks 
was dealt under national insolvency procedures, as applied to other insolvent 
undertakings.190 Normal insolvency proceedings are not always the most appropriate 
manner to deal with a bank failure, as they do not operate swiftly, and may not ensure 
the continuation of the bank’s critical function nor preserve the financial stability of the 
EU. The BRRD should apply to credit institutions subject to the prudential requirements 
laid down in the CRD IV/CRR.191  The BRRD specifies that a resolution scheme should 
be proportionate to the systemic importance of the credit institution.192 
(3) The DGSD harmonises the laws of the Member States regarding the rules on deposit 
guarantee schemes (‘DGSs’) to which the credit institutions are subject, increasing the 
stability of the banking system and the protection of depositors.193 The Member States 
shall ensure that at least one DGS is introduced on their territory.194 A credit institution 
                                                      
184 Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on access to the activity 
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shall not take deposits if it is not a member of a DGS.195 The DGSD provides for a 
uniform level deposit safeguard of up to 100.000 euros per depositor, should the bail-in 
tool be applied to a failing credit institution.196 The DGSs are financed through ex ante 
funding from banks amounting to 0,8% of their covered deposits.197 
 
6.2.1.2. The Single Supervisory Mechanism 
 
The Single Supervisory Mechanism was created by the SSM Regulation, adopted on the basis 
of Article 127(6) TFEU.198 The ECB is now supervising all the banks of the Eurozone as well 
as banks in other participating countries, together with the national competent authorities of the 
Euro zone. The ECB will directly supervise credit institutions of significant importance, being 
banks having assets of more than 30 billion euros, or constituting at least 20% of their country’s 
GDP.199 The national competent authorities will supervise less significant institutions, but the 
ECB can decide at any time to place of one these institutions under its direct supervision.200  
 
Supervisory tasks include for instance the grant or withdrawal of authorisation to the credit 
institutions and ensuring that credit institutions have in place robust governance 
arrangements.201 The SSM Regulation points out that the ECB should carry out its tasks in 
compliance with Commission decisions in the area of State aid.202 
 
An assessment of the Eurozone banks’ balance sheets has been carried out to ensure that the 
institutions entering the SSM are viable.203 
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6.2.1.3. The Single Resolution Mechanism and the Single Resolution Fund 
 
The Single Resolution Mechanism is based on the SRM Regulation, adopted on the basis of 
Article 114 TFEU.204 The SRM Regulation lays down the principle that effective resolution 
mechanisms are necessary tools to avoid damages to the public interest and the financial 
stability that have occurred because of failures of banks in the past.205 The SRM Regulation 
covers all banks participating in the SSM.206   
 
A new agency, the Single Resolution Board (‘SRB’) has been created, whose role is to resolve 
failing banks in an orderly manner by an early intervention. The SRB and the national resolution 
authorities are thus entrusted with a central power of resolution. The SRM Regulation now 
provides for clear rules regarding the resolution of cross-border entities, essential for the 
completion of the internal market for financial services. Ensuring effective and uniform 
resolution rules is essential to prevent negative systemic impacts of bank crisis on the financial 
stability of the EU.207 When making decisions, the SRB is to take into consideration possible 
adverse effects on participating and non-participating Member States, such as threats to the 
financial stability.208 
 
The decision-making process and the adoption of resolution schemes involve the ECB, the 
Commission and the Council, as regards the discretionary aspects of the scheme, and is 
designed to permit swift action compared to regular insolvency proceedings, as the scheme can 
be adopted by the SRB within 24 hours if it does not raise any concern from the part of the 
Commission.209 The decision to put an entity under resolution should be taken before it is 
balance sheet insolvent, after it has been determined that the entity is failing or likely to fail and 
that no private sector measure would be able to prevent the failure.210 An entity is deemed to 
be failing or likely to fail notably when it is unable to pay its debts when they fall due, or when 
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the entity requires recourse to exceptional public financial support, except in some 
circumstances. Exceptional public financial support means State aid within the meaning of 
Article 107(1).211 The need for ELA is not per se a demonstration that the entity is failing. If 
the ELA provided by a national central bank is guaranteed by a State, its provision is subject to 
State aid rules, but does not necessarily trigger the resolution of the recipient bank, if certain 
conditions are met. ELA is used in the event of a systemic liquidity shortage, to preserve the 
financial stability; it should be limited in time, it should be approved under State aid rules and 
should not be part of a larger aid package. The Member State should also ensure that the 
guarantee is sufficiently remunerated by the recipient credit institution.  
 
The winding-up of a credit institution should be considered under normal liquidation 
proceedings before applying resolution tools to it.212 The choice between the two procedures 
depends on their effects on creditors and the financial stability; the shareholders should not 
suffer greater losses under a resolution scheme than what they would have suffered under 
normal liquidation proceedings (the ‘no creditor worse off’ principle).213 An ex-post 
comparison is possible.214 The objectives of the resolution procedure are to ensure continuity 
of essential financial services, to maintain the financial stability and to protect the depositors.215 
 
A resolution scheme should ensure that shareholders and subordinated creditors bear a 
proportionate bear of losses, to reduce moral hazard by giving the incentive to the board to 
manage the credit institution in a sound and reasonable way in order to avoid exit strategies 
from the shareholders, knowing that they will no longer be bailed-out by the State. The SRM 
Regulation provides thus for use of the bail-in tool, provided that it abides by the right to 
property enshrined in Article 17 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, in compliance with its 
Article 52.216 Bail-in tool means the mechanism for effecting the exercise of the write-down 
and conversion powers in relation to liabilities of an institution under resolution.217 Deposits 
under 100,000 euros are covered and should not be used in a bail-in mechanism. The Court, in 
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its case Kotnik, has ruled that the bail-in tool does not constitute an intolerable interference to 
the right to property.218 
 
The Single Resolution Fund (‘SRF’) is financed by contributions of all banks in the EU. 
Contributions to the Fund should take account of the degree of risk presented by the institution. 
Its purpose is to break the link between bank debt and sovereign debt.219 The Fund should only 
be used after the resources from shareholders and creditors are exhausted.220 
 
6.2.1.4. The European Deposit Insurance Scheme 
 
The European Deposit Insurance Scheme is the third pillar of the Banking Union and is based 
on a proposal of the Commission of 24 November 2015. The proposed regulation will establish 
a common EDIS, which would as of 2024 fully insure national DGSs. The DGSD harmonised 
the rules governing the national DGSs, but did not create a DGS at EU level. The EDIS will 
progressively ensure that national DGSs do no longer rely on Member State financial support.  
 
There’s a difference of scope between the EDIS and the SSM/SRM. The EDIS will cover a 
wider scope, mirroring the scope of the DGSD; the EDIS proposal applies to all entities 
affiliated to a DGS. Certain entities covered by the DGSs are not supervised or regulated by the 
SSM or SRM.221  
 
The aim of having a wider scope could be to protect all depositors against negative 
consequences of insolvency proceedings, not only depositors of credit institutions regulated by 
the SSM/SRM. 
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6.2.2. The Banking Union and State aid control 
 
State aid control remains a central element of the Banking Union, as the State aid rules continue 
to apply during resolution proceedings, to ensure a level playing field.  
 
Article 19(1) of the SRM Regulation states that when a resolution scheme involves the use of 
State aid, the Commission must first assess its compatibility with the internal market, instead 
of simply endorsing the resolution scheme by not objecting to it within 24 hours as provided 
for in Article 18(7) of the SRM Regulation.222 If the resolution scheme entails a State aid 
measure, the Board should invite the Member State concerned to notify the scheme to the 
Commission under Article 108(3) TFEU. In the same way, if the resolution scheme includes 
use of the SRF, the Board shall notify it to the Commission.223 The Commission will assess 
whether use of the Fund distorts competition or not. The involvement of the Commission in the 
resolution process means that the SRB and the Commission should work closely together and 
exchange all information necessary.  
 
Under the BRRD, any State aid support implies that an institution is failing or likely to fail.224 
When State aid is provided, it should lead to resolution of the bank. It is the responsibility of 
the supervising body or resolution authority to ensure that a resolution scheme is applied to the 
recipient bank, not of the Commission. The Commission only assesses whether the intended 
measure complies with the State aid rules. 
 
There are three exceptions to the principle that provision of State aid to a credit institution 
should trigger its resolution, according to Article 18(4)(d): 
(1) State guarantee to ELA; 
(2) State guarantee of newly issued liabilities; 
(3) Precautionary recapitalisation, which can only be used to cover capital shortfalls arising 
under a scenario of stress test. 
In these cases, only State aid rules apply, and the entity will not automatically be considered as 
failing or likely to fail.    
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As regards DGSs, Article 7(3)(e) of the SRM Regulation provides that compensation payments 
to creditors are not State aid; but contribution to resolution by a DGS as provided for in Article 
11(3) of the DGSD must be assessed under the State aid framework, according to Article 19 
SRM.225 
 
State aid control is a key element for successfully achieving the change from bail-out to bail-in 
in the Banking Union. Any kind of public financial support to credit institutions, including the 
use of deposit guarantee schemes or funds of the SRF, is subject to State aid control.226  
 
6.3. Summary 
 
 
The Banking Union completes the European Monetary Union and the single market in financial 
services. The Banking Union is comprised of a Single Supervisory Mechanism, a Single 
Resolution Mechanism, and a European Deposit Insurance Scheme, the latter being 
progressively introduced.  
In the Banking Union, supervisory and resolution rules are now harmonised and enforced at 
EU level. Credit institutions are now supervised by the European Central Bank and the 
European System of Central Banks, while a new body has been designed to adopt resolution 
schemes, the Single Resolution Board. State aid rules remain applicable during the resolution 
process; any use of State aid or resolution funds should only be granted after shareholders and 
subordinated creditors have contributed to the losses through the bail-in tool. The aim of the 
bail-in tool is to reduce moral hazard; mathematically, when a bank is failing someone has to 
cover the losses, and if the bail-out mechanism is no longer an option, the board will be less 
likely to adopt risky behaviours and risk-taking business models. The switch from bail-out to 
bail-in has the purpose to break the vicious circle between bank debt and sovereign debt. As a 
consequence, the credibility of a bank will no longer depend on its location, but on its risk 
profile.227 The Banking Union also provides for harmonised deposit coverage; deposits under 
100.000 euros shall be guaranteed by a deposit guarantee scheme, currently set up at national 
level, but soon covered by a common deposit insurance scheme.   
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7. Conclusion 
 
All sectors of the economy have been hit by the financial and economic crisis, but the financial 
sector has been harmed in a particular way. In other fields of the economy, the failure of an 
economic actor is likely to favour competition, by liberating market shares for its competitors. 
In the banking sector, the failure of one bank, especially an important one, is a negative 
externality for others and can trigger a negative collapse spiral if its failure is not controlled.  
 
That is why the Member States invested so much aid in their banking systems during the crisis; 
the aim was not only to save one bank, and to protect the employees and depositors (which 
would have been done under Article 107(3)(c) TFEU), but to save the system. The banks saved 
were considered ‘too big to fail,’ because of their systemic importance and their 
interconnectedness. Against that background, Article 107(3)(b) TFEU was used to remedy to 
the serious disturbance their failure would cause in the economy of the EU. 
 
State aid was also used to inject liquidity into the market, as banks became reluctant to lend to 
each other. 
 
The State aid principles as enshrined in the Treaties were respected during the whole time of 
the crisis. State aid should not overly distort competition nor have an impact on trade between 
Member States. If such effects were likely to arise, because of the volume of aid granted or the 
size of the bank, aid was only provided at the price of compensatory measures. The Crisis 
Framework was enacted in respect of these principles. Only the scope has been extended: the 
restructuring plans were approved for five years instead of two or three, and restructuring aid 
was granted for more than six months, in some cases, at the condition that the Member State 
would provide reports to the Commission. 
 
State aid control is thus a handy tool to preserve the financial stability of the EU and at the same 
time maintaining a level playing field amongst aided and non-aided banks. The Commission 
managed to produce a temporary framework in a very short lap of time. At first, the Commission 
relaxed some requirements, such as the threshold for own contribution to the costs of the bank, 
but starting from the Restructuring Communication burden sharing was enforced.  
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As the financial crisis and the forced bail-out of several non-viable banks have been costly for 
EU’s taxpayers, the EU institutions have decided to foster the Economic and Monetary Union 
integration by creating the Banking Union. As the Banking Union creates a new body in charge 
of resolving failing banks, the resolution will now be applied in consistently. If the Banking 
Union had been in place at the times of the crisis, the cost on taxpayers would maybe have been 
lowered thanks to the bail-in tool. But there is a chance that the bail-in tool would have damaged 
confidence in the banking sector, with the depositors fearing to lose their deposits. The bail-in 
tool was established as the rampart against moral hazard, but not all banks that needed State aid 
were necessarily having risk-taking behaviours or risky business models.  
 
In conclusion, we can note that the Commission did what it could to control State aid with the 
tools available during the crisis, and made sure that in all cases compensatory measures were 
applied, as well as an appropriate remuneration for the aid. The Commission made sure no 
banks were artificially kept on the market, by asking for viability review when aid was granted 
without restructuring plan. Decisions were adopted within a concise period, which did not 
prevent the Commission from presenting detailed economic based assessments of the measures 
and their effects on competition. This necessity for swift action is emphasised in the SRM 
Regulation, which provides that decisions of the SRB to put a bank into resolution should be 
adopted within 24 hours. State aid control has been a useful tool, but the crisis has shown that 
an effective permanent banking sector regulation was needed, establishing a temporary crisis 
framework during each financial crisis is not a valid option. A regulatory framework and State 
aid control are interconnected, as an efficient supervisory mechanism, as well as early 
intervention measures, should usually allow detecting problems at a sufficiently early stage to 
prevent future recourse to taxpayers’ money.  
 
As it relates to the next challenges, the future Brexit, and its unpredictable outcome could be 
one of them, with the uncertainty regarding resolution of cross-border UK banks and State aid 
regulation, even if the UK is not a member of the Eurozone and chose not to opt into the SSM.  
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